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INTERWAR AMERICAN HISTORIES: LEFT,
RIGHT, AND WRONG
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Frank, Lay et al., and Ross all deal with the aftermath of the United States’s brief
involvement in the FirstWorldWar, and some of its enduring eﬀects – political reaction
with devastating results for the labour movement and progressive politics, brutalization
of America’s then-normal nativism, directed at members of the recent immigrant
communities making up about a third of its population.
The setting for Frank’s case study of workers’ movements in the post-war era is
Seattle. This regional city far from the industrial heartlandwas temporarily transformed
by its participation in the wartime shipbuilding boom. It experienced an enormous
inﬂux of industrial workers, who became thoroughly unionized. But America’s war was
hardly begun before it was over ; the war economy wound down evenmore rapidly than
it had been created; the federal government stopped acting as shipbuilding’s customer
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and regulator ; and the Seattle labour movement, which had gone up like a rocket, fell
back like the stick. It signalled its impending collapse by mounting a brief, ineﬀectual,
but none the less celebrated, ‘general strike ’ in February 1919. Thereafter, it was
downhill almost all the way, as the shipbuilding industry nationwide shrank back to its
pre-war size, and the Seattle labour movement participated fully in the general collapse
of unionists’ collective strength and aspirations which the post-war years witnessed. The
federal government’s abandonment of organized labour, and indeed renewed
opposition to it ; the collapse of employment, in the metal-working industries in
particular ; the resumption of employers’ and other local elites’ unfettered hostility, all
the more powerful because clothed in the rhetoric of anti-radical patriotism burnished
by the war – all these familiar explanations played their part, in Seattle and elsewhere,
and together constitute, one might have thought, a suﬃcient explanation for observed
disappointments.
Frank would have us think otherwise. She oﬀers a non-traditional interpretation for
that hoariest of old labour-historical chestnuts, the timidity and fragility of American
working-class movements. This represents an attempt, of a kind becoming more
common, to shift the focus of historical investigation from the world of production
relations towards those of consumption, and therefore away from trade unions towards
other working-class institutions, frommale workers towards their womenfolk, and to an
extent from materialist towards ‘culturalist ’ explanations for working-class behaviour
and passivity. In addition, she displays the modern American historian’s usual concern
with ‘diversity ’ and ‘ inclusiveness ’. In a city which was overwhelmingly white, its
residents mostly native-born, British, Canadians, Scandinavians, or Germans, united in
their ﬁerce hostility towards those who were not, Frank is insistent on giving more than
due attention to the members of the small local Asian and African-American minorities,
and on explaining Seattle labour’s weakness, in part, by its failure to include them
within its strategies and concerns.
The result is an extremely interesting book which takes us into all kinds of fascinating
byways while rarely losing sight of the central plot. Her great contribution is to remind
readers of a period when a signiﬁcant number of American workers still dreamed of
alternatives to the capitalist provision of everyday goods and services, and sometimes
tried to enact their dreams. The Rochdale model of co-operation, alongside the
Wobblies’ vague syndicalism, the Socialists’ equally vague ‘co-operative common-
wealth’, and the Bolsheviks’ clear, violent path to social transformation, appealed to key
activists within the Seattle labour movement and, for a time, to a sizeable popular
constituency. Workers could maximize their buying power during a time of inﬂation
and shortages, increase their collective ability to resist business pressures, and peacefully
nurture the germ of a new order within the shell of the old; individual self-interest and
collective class interests could be brought into alignment.
In theory, at least. In practice, consumers’ and producers’ co-ops were poorly
resourced, badly led, and weakly supported. The depression of 1920–1922 disposed of
most of them. Thereafter, a shrinking Seattle labour movement, conﬁned to local-
market industries – particularly construction, transportation, and services – turned to
 Joseph A. McCartin’s Labor’s great war: the struggle for industrial democracy and the origins of modern
American labor relations, 	
	–	
	 (Chapel Hill, 1997), is the best as well as the most recent study of
the subject ; David Brody, Labor in crisis : the steel strike of 	
	
 (New York, 1965), and Colin Davis,
Power at odds: the national railroad shopmen’s strike (Urbana and Chicago, 1997), are excellent
accounts of the two great nationwide conﬂicts bracketing the post-war reaction.
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other, less ambitious consumer-oriented strategies – boycotts of anti-union employers,
and promotion of pro-union employers to working-class customers – to bolster its
position. Neither approach was especially eﬀective, partly, argues Frank, because the
surviving American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions – cautious, conservative,
increasingly run by their oﬃcials on ‘businesslike ’ lines, accepting little input from their
(largely male) members, still less from the latter’s wives – were unsuited to organizing
campaigns dependent on willing mass participation.
Frank’s argument is at its most strained when she is forced to speculate about the
motives of some of her unorganized and inarticulate, or at least scarcely recorded,
historical actors. It is more dependable when dealing with those she ﬁnds least attractive
– the conservative union leadership. She explains very well their withdrawal from
tolerance of oppositional politics into a series of cosy bargains with local employers as a
condition of their organizations’ survival and even modest growth in their traditional
niches. Her work is the ﬁrst for some time to choose the AFL in the 1920s as its subject,
to take our understanding of the forces for change within it from the national to the local
level, and to explain developments in terms of the movement’s evolving structure and
composition as well as its leaders’ ideology. The institutional core of the book is
substantial and persuasive; the rest, while always interesting, almost seems beside the
point, so over-determined is the outcome by the ordinary processes of political economy.
The book is quite well written, and represents a genuine contribution to knowledge.
But her conclusion (p. 249) that ‘Once we begin the process of incorporating gender,
race, and consumption into the history of working-class organizations, it seems diﬃcult
to imagine a story without them’ is made rather than proved. Undeniably, she has
added to the conventional tale, but it would have stood quite well without the support.
The associated claims that ‘When we integrate gender and race we can see the ways in
which the white and the male portions of the working class undermined their own
cause’ and ‘ imagine ‘‘class ’’ in a manner that includes all working people and all the
work they perform and imagine a working-class social movement built by addressing
the interests of the entire working class ’ also read like gestures of solidarity towards an
academic peer-group. In the hands of some of her less judicious sisters, strong forms of
these arguments come close to making divisions of gender within the working classes
more signiﬁcant than other divisions of labour among them, and to painting such unions
as survived the normal painful defeats at the hands of their employers as the enemies of
the (reiﬁed, idealized, singular) working class rather than as the ﬂawed and feeble
representatives of the more fortunately placed among them. Frank does not let her
convictions spoil her history in this fashion – readers can spot, and skip, the
editorializing, excision of which leaves a solid analytical narrative.
Shawn Lay and her fellow-contributors deal with an altogether more signiﬁcant
social movement in 1920s America than the vestiges of labour and radicalism – the
second Ku Klux Klan, which was for a time more numerous, and arguably much more
mainstream. The Klan was recreated in 1915 as an unfortunate consequence of the
success of revisionist scholars, novelists, and, ﬁnally, the great ﬁlm-maker D. W.
Griﬃth, in selling a generation of white Americans a version of the history of the ﬁrst,
 For an extreme example of this tendency, see Elizabeth Faue, Community of suﬀering and struggle:
women, men, and the labor movement inMinneapolis, 	
	–	
 (Chapel Hill, 1991), whichmany friendly
reviewers seemed to ﬁnd surprisingly persuasive. Ava Baron, ed. Work engendered: toward a new
history of American labor (Ithaca, 1991), is generally more sophisticated.
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Reconstruction era, Klan which legitimized and glamorized its anti-black violence.
The second Klan far outdistanced the ﬁrst, partly because of its organizers’ astute
promotional skills, but also because they latched onto recruits’ desires for fellowship,
excitement, and power against a host of imagined domestic enemies in the troubled
aftermath of war. It spread far beyond the South; it became a largely urban
phenomenon; its leaders took the common hatreds of white American Protestant
citizens – towards African-Americans, Catholics, Jews, radicals, indeed aliens of every
stripe – and turned them into the foundations of a movement with an appeal to millions
of bigots in bedsheets.
The Klan has not lacked historians. Lay and her associates represent a self-conscious
‘ third wave’ of KKK studies, diﬀerent from its predecessors in their insistence on the
Klan’s normality. Rather than representing the underside of American history – a
censorious, chauvinistic lower middle class turned really nasty – their Klan is an
ordinary social movement whose members possess as much right as any other past
historical actors to have their prejudices dealt with sympathetically. The third wave’s
exercise in revision is justiﬁed as ‘align[ing] Klan studies with the dominant trend in
United States social history, that of compassionately and nonjudgmentally assessing the
lives and activities of ordinary citizens ’ (p. 12). Rather than being dismissed with any
cosmopolitan version of E. P. Thompson’s celebrated ‘enormous condescension of
history’, Klansmen (and, in two important recent monographs, women) are to be
understood as ‘a kind of interest group for the average white Protestant who believed
that his values should be dominant in American society’ (p. 34). So that’s OK, then.
Diversity, inclusiveness, and empathetic history can even make room for millions of
what many of their more urbane contemporaries dismissed as hooded morons, whose
multitude of hatreds can be minimized by scholars writing with the safety of three
generations of hindsight as mostly rhetoric, or pooh-poohed as ‘ so-called intolerance’
(p. 218).
A part of the revisionism results from historians’ decisions to focus on the Klan outside
of the South, so that the troubling reality of its continuing tradition of violence can be
blurred by avoiding the communities where that was most prevalent. Other third wave
monographs have dealt with the industrial North; all the contributors to this volume
deal with small towns and cities in the West, a region which contained relatively few
blacks, Jews, or immigrant Catholics, only 7 per cent of KKK members, and whose
representativeness is therefore open to question. Leonard Moore writes, as if to
minimize rather than explain them, that ‘ethnic hostilities played a part in the Klan
only in those communities…where non-white Protestants [sic] could be found in
signiﬁcant numbers ’ (p. 31). Surprise, surprise : if they were not there, you could hardly
attack them, except rhetorically. Robert Goldberg argues that Denver, Colorado,
Klansmen’s violent and threatening behaviour, while ‘reprehensible and to be
condemned’, must also be considered ‘as tactics in a struggle for power’ (p. 48). So
that’s OK too. But the sceptical reader is free to ask: power for what ends?
 Michael Kazin, ‘The grass-roots right : new histories of U.S. conservatism in the twentieth
century’, American Historical Review, 97 (1992), pp. 136–55 at pp. 140–5, reviews two major
monographs, Leonard J. Moore’s Citizen klansmen: the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana, 	
	–	
# (Chapel
Hill, 1991) and Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: racism and gender in the 	
s (Berkeley, 1991),
and discusses the ‘ third wave’ in general. Nancy K.MacLean, Behind the mask of chivalry: the making
of the second Ku Klux Klan (New York, 1994), partners Blee in ‘gendering’ the Klan, but, with its
Southern focus, is understandably much more critical than other recent works.
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The third element in the revisionist method, apart from an amoral relativism and an
apologetic tendency, is the application of social science technique. Klansmen’s (and
women’s) normality can be demonstrated, rather than simply asserted, by the tedious
but sometimes revealing processes of collective biography, which appear to show that
there was little in the way of demographic detail to distinguish your average Klansman
from his Protestant neighbours. They were middle-aged, middle-class, as Americans use
the term, drawn from a wide spectrum of north-west European ethnic groups and
Protestant (not particularly fundamentalist) denominations. The broad appeal of the
KKK was established even by ‘second wave’ historians in the 1960s ; the third wave
subtracts their continuing revulsion, and adds copious detail.
The ﬁnal stage of legitimizing the Klan is to answer the above ‘power for what ends? ’
question in the cosiest way possible. These small-town knights appear to have been
driven most of all by a desire for moral policing which was not very diﬀerent, even in
method – a combination of majoritarian politics and vigilante threats and violence –
from that favoured by less questionable organizations also representing America’s
white Protestant majority. The Klan agenda commonly included demands for strict
enforcement of laws against prostitution and the liquor trade, attacks on corrupt or
inactive local police and politicians (the latter parish-pumpers generally described by
solemn, Klan-apologetic historians as ‘elites ’, which automatically puts them in the
wrong), and a variety of pressures against non-Protestants, non-whites, and non-
citizens.
Klan historians are undoubtedly correct in arguing that these were mainstream issues
in a decade of Prohibition, when nativism succeeded in closing America’s hitherto open
door to European migrants, and making life much harder for the millions already
settled. But, as Michael Kazin has argued, Klan historians have been almost too
successful in their normalizing task. The more ordinary and representative they make
it seem, the harder it is for them to explain why, even at the time, it was so controversial,
met with so much opposition from other Protestants demographically scarcely
distinguishable from its supporters, was so vulnerable and transitory. Klan support
seems to have been amile wide but an inch deep; the reputation for secrecy and violence
simultaneously drew in members and denied the organization and possibility of
legitimacy; Jewish and Catholic conspiracies against the Protestant republic did not, of
course, emerge to validate Klan rhetoric and consolidate its grass-roots base ; more
respectable and eﬀective fraternal and nativist organizations coexisted and competed
with it ; and its leaders seem to have included an unusually high proportion of self-
seeking opportunists and, to put it mildly, public relations disasters – at least as corrupt
in oﬃce as the ‘elites ’ they displaced.
In the end, what is wrong with the contributions in Lay’s collection, and withmodern
‘Klan studies ’ in general, apart from the inability of their collective-biographical
techniques to explain why a minority of otherwise representative middle-class
Protestants gave their support to this organization while most did not, and their weak
explanations for Klan failure, is the matter of tone. They are so successful at representing
the Klan as just another fraternal, nativistic, superpatriotic, populistic, grass-roots
organization, that one almost forgets that Masons, Shriners, Eagles, Elks, Odd Fellows,
and American Legionnaireswere not in the habit of setting up blazing crosses, organizing
‘poison squads ’ to boycott Catholic and Jewish businesses, or parading runaway nuns
 Kazin, ‘The grass-roots right ’, pp. 142, 145.
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telling their terrible tales of papist plots. These community histories are uniformly ﬂat,
boring, and value-free, which is perhaps their authors’ intention; but that hardly
recommends them to the reader.
After the above, it is with some relief that one turns to Ross’s very plain, even worthily
dull, but completely honest and untendentious work at the borderland of legal and
religious history. His is an account of the origins in wartime and post-war nativism of a
battle in which local ‘elites ’, Masons, and Klansmen could all join together – a
campaign to restrict or deny the freedom of minority ethnic and religious communities
to preserve their language and their culture by maintaining their own separate, private
school systems or even, where they were suﬃciently numerous, inﬂuencing local school
boards to the same eﬀect. Midwestern state politics had long pitted Catholics and
Lutherans – the groups most committed to separate parochial schooling and the
maintenance of foreign-language instruction – against nativist advocates of universal,
state-controlled, English-language, and nominally secular education. The war gave a
new twist to this old campaign, and singled out German Lutherans for special attention.
Despite the latter’s attempts to demonstrate their American patriotism, their continuing
attachment to the language of the Kaiser made them vulnerable, particularly in the
Middle West and Plains states, where they were the most numerous and visible ethnic
minority. Vigilante action and state laws or proclamations drove speaking in German
out of public places and private telephone conversations, schools, libraries, and even
churches, Iowa’s governor asserting in June 1918 that ‘ there is no use in anyone wasting
his time praying in other languages than English. God is listening only to the English
tongue’ (p. 45), the (ironically compulsory) ‘ language of liberty’ and the only one
in which, a Congregationalist minister had earlier stated, one could ‘ think American
thoughts ’ (p. 25).
Ross details these proscriptive campaigns, and the accommodating, assimilationist
response of most Lutherans – a conservative and generally quietist group. But the
pressure did not end when the war did, and Lutherans were unwilling to make the
ultimate sacriﬁce that ‘Americanizers ’ demanded as the majority of states passed laws
demanding English-medium education in public and private schools alike. As war
hysteria receded, Lutherans were able to lobby for compromises protecting German-
language religious instruction in their parochial schools ; but then they were caught up
again by renewed, chieﬂy anti-Catholic, nativism, which resulted in a second wave of
state initiatives supported by a broad spectrum of Protestants determined to extirpate
separate religious school systems altogether.
Ross provides an excellent explanation for this unhappy time. The heart of his book
is about the churches’ response. When accommodation and compromise failed, the
Lutherans turned to bold and astute political campaigning, often in partnership with
Catholics, and sometimes with the support of Jews and African-Americans ; when penal
laws were enacted and enforced, the alternative strategy of an appeal for judicial
intervention beckoned. But in state after state, supreme courts found in favour of the
acts, and the only recourse left was the US Supreme Court.
On the face of it, the chances of success were slim: the Court’s record of defending civil
liberties was poor, its available precedents for defending such freedoms against state
regulation inadequate. Nevertheless, the litigants pressed their cases, using a variety of
 Ross explains, incidentally, why multi-ethnic Americans became about as monolingual as the
British : ‘ the proportion of high school students studying German [hitherto the most popular
foreign language] fell from 25 per cent in 1915 to 1 per cent in 1922 ’ (p. 65).
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arguments ranging from the novel proposition that the states were bound by the federal
Bill of Rights to the apparently more promising contention, given the Court’s deep
conservatism, that the disputed laws were taking away churches’ property rights in their
schools and German-language or private-school teachers’ rights to pursue a legitimate
vocation, and also violating parents’ rights to control their children’s education.
Surprisingly, the litigants won – both the speciﬁcally anti-German-language cases in
1923, and the broader issue of the right to maintain parochial and voluntary schools,
albeit subject to state regulation, in 1925. At the height of the KKK’s inﬂuence, one of
themost conservative benches of SupremeCourt justices in history struck an unexpected
series of blows for liberty. In 1927 they were even prepared to build on their new
precedents to defend a far smaller andmore vulnerable minority, Hawaii’s Japanese, up
against local racist pressure.
What is the signiﬁcance of Ross’s model study? In part, he supplies what is missing
from so much KKK scholarship, an understanding of how and why militant nativism,
far from being considered normal, ordinary, and unproblematic at the time, ﬁssured
even the anglo-Protestant community. It also helped provoke the formation of inter-
ethnic oppositional coalitions in defence of basic civil rights, of a kind which would later
ﬂourish within the urban Democratic party. The KKK, and nativism in general, did
not just decline ; they were challenged from within and outwith Protestant re-
spectability ; in crucial respects, even in the 1920s, and particularly on the battleground
of ideas, they were defeated.
The school cases also started a process which gave embattled minority groups a new
and promising defensive strategy. For the Supreme Court did indeed begin to grant
other personal liberties the same kind of ‘ substantive due process ’ protection it had
previously reserved for property rights, and it would very shortly commence
incorporating the Bill of Rights into state law. Ross traces a clear line of descent for the
civil rights jurisprudence which has done so much to shape modern American public
policy and discourse, all the way from the school cases to the pro-contraception and
abortion decisions of the 1960s and 70s. Ironically, these helped provoke a new backlash
from the godly right – a group in which denominations which were the targets of earlier
persecution sit alongside their erstwhile persecutors. Ross’s ﬁne book gives readers a
credible and quite original insight into the roots of this unexpected present in an almost-
forgotten past.
II
The second trio of books deals with the problem of communism in America’s depression
decade. Morris’s slim but not cheap volume is the least interesting, neither impressive
as argument nor competent as prose. He adds little to the literatures on the Ukrainian
famine, American visitors to the USSR and their regrettable tendency to miss (or fail
to report) bad news, or indeed Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to recognize the USSR in
1933. He laments that ‘very little was heard about ’ the famine, though it ‘ should have
been a major news story’ (p. 81). Similarly, despite the fact that the State Department
was quite well informed, reports rarely circulated any further than mid-level oﬃcials,
who took no action. This was largely because of a principled opposition to interference
in the aﬀairs of foreign countries – which Morris criticizes from a politically naive
contemporary perspective, rather than attempting to understand or explain. He berates
them for failing to publish this information as a counter to pro-Soviet reporting in the
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American press, but is sharp enough to understand that this might have compromised
the administration’s plans for improved Soviet-American relations. Morris’s major
contribution is bringing this internal documentation to readers’ attention, though even
here he is less than wholly original. When he turns to presidential policy making, he
repeats well-known criticisms of Roosevelt’s workingmethods andmotivations. Answers
to questions about what the president knew or thought about conditions within the
USSR, and their relevance to his government’s strategy towards it, are largely
speculative (e.g. p. 138) or misleading (‘chose to ignore’, p. 163). The briefest summary
is that the president neither knew nor cared very much, but Morris thinks he should
have. Really, the book rests on a false premise : that the policy of recognition in 1933
should have been aﬀected by the rhetoric of the modern diplomacy of human rights,
rather than by its practice. This has always been suﬃciently elastic to permit the United
States to continue to extend recognition and even support to a wide variety of bastard
regimes, in line with realpolitik principles – because they are there andor because they
are convenient. This is poor stuﬀ; its closing accusation of a ‘conspiracy of silence’
(p. 167) is no more persuasive than the rest of the work.
After Morris’s sophomoric eﬀorts, we return to works of quality – Warren’s thirty-
year-old classic, justly republished, with a useful new introduction reviewing the last
generation’s historiography, andKutulas’s intelligent, but comparatively inelegant and
schematic, journey over some of the same ground. These are both studies of politically
engaged intellectuals spread across the spectrum from the centre to the far left, and of
the impact on their ideas and behaviour of the domestic and international crises of the
1930s. Both are concerned with that generation’s diverse reactions to the ‘Soviet
experiment’ and the Communist party of the USA.
Thewords ‘ liberal ’ and ‘ liberalism’, or indeed ‘ intellectual ’, have slipperymeanings.
Both authors use the latter in much the same way – in Warren’s deﬁnition, ‘one who
deals primarily in ideas and is free from the restrictions of public oﬃce’ (p. 4) – but their
typologies of the former are confusingly incompatible. Warren’s and Kutulas’s anti-
communist liberals are much the same people, but his ‘ independent radicals ’, ‘Russian
sympathizers ’, and ‘ fellow travelers ’ overlap with some of her anti-communists, older
liberals, and ‘Progressives ’. At the same time, her spectrum is much broader than his,
including party intellectuals at one extreme and, at the other, elements of the non-
communist left which, by the end of the decade, were moving beyond anti-Stalinism
into anti-communism, making common cause with liberal anti-communists and
disillusioned ‘Russian sympathizers ’, and well on the way towards their eventual
destination, the post-war right.
Warren’s book is a nice reminder of a lost world of American historical writing, a ﬁne
product of the profession at or near its post-war peak in terms of sheer intellectual
quality. The book is a joy to read, good-tempered and conﬁdent in its own values and
well-grounded generalizations. It is clearly dated – not least in its unreﬂective use of
(male) gendered language as if it were inclusive ; but it still seems reliable, dissecting
American liberalism and explaining changing patterns of attitudes towards the ‘Soviet
experiment’ and Popular Front. It oﬀers inﬁnitely more thanMorris to any reader who
wishes to understand the pattern of (mis)perceptions of the USSR, and rather more
than Kutulas towards an interpretation of liberal world-views. Warren describes very
well the distorting, American-made lenses through which his characters examined the
USSR. In doing so, he also accounts for the dominant interwar liberal commitment to
statism and planning, and relative indiﬀerence towards civil liberties and a politics of
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morality, in a way which is fully consistent with that oﬀered by the most recent and
perceptive commentator on the same phenomena, Gary Gerstle.
Warren and Kutulas cover much the same territory: many liberals’ desire for unity
among ‘progressives ’ even before the Community party ended its bizarre Third Period
and inaugurated the Popular Front; attitudes towards the USSR, and in particular
towards some of its more anti-social behaviour (forced collectivization, genocidal
famine as an instrument of policy, political dictatorship, routine denial of civil liberties,
trials, purges, and the Nazi-Soviet pact and Finnish War of 1939–40) ; and the Spanish
Civil War. Kutulas explains the last very well as, not simply the cause which gave the
Popular Front its principal raison d ’e tre, but almost the only glue holding the Front
together by 1938 as doubts about the Soviet Union itself, and the acceptability of
continuing co-operation with its domestic cheerleaders in the CPUSA, became ever
stronger.
Diﬀerences between them are partly matters of technique. Warren’s is an example of
an older kind of intellectual history which focuses on what prominent ﬁgures wrote,
particularly inTheNation andTheNewRepublic, American liberalism’s housemagazines.
He is very good at teasing out meaning and discerning ﬁne shades of diﬀerence.
Kutulas’s research base is much broader, including collections of personal papers and
the archives of key liberal and Popular Front pressure groups. She is therefore more
concerned with the inner politics of the diverse liberal and ‘progressive ’ communities
than simply with their verbal expressions, and aims to produce ‘a social history of
intellectuals and their institutions ’ (p. 16). This leads her towards an interesting but
half-baked, though oft-repeated, explanation of some of the divisions she articulates,
and developments she charts : that these were reﬂective of generational change and
conﬂict within the ranks of the overwhelmingly New York-based intellectuals she and
Warren have both studied. Rather than being the result of interaction between liberals’
inadequate ideas and a Soviet Union and Communist party of the USA (CPUSA)
which were hard and unreliable allies to cope with, the growth of anti-Stalinism and
anti-communism in particular is explained as a byproduct of the personal, often
careerist resentment of younger (largely Jewish) intellectuals against an older (largely
WASP) liberal establishment. This is semi-plausible, but Kutulas does not help her case
by presenting the results of the collective biographical work underpinning her argument
in a single crude table (p. 24) with no sources or discussion of methodology, so that one
has to take her sampling techniques and categorizations on trust. Presumably this part
of her scholarly apparatus was one of the sacriﬁces she was forced tomake between thesis
and publication. As it stands, the argument rests on little more than assertion and
anecdote, and impresses one as rather reductive; it seems intended to diminish the bad
guys (and gals) in her story, the disputatious, rightward-bound anti-Stalinists, and to
spare her the necessity of examining their ideas as carefully as she does those of the
historical actors she ﬁnds more appealing. It is fairly plain that the latter are her
‘progressives ’, and that, despite everything she says against the CPUSA, she is
uncomfortable with the new scholarship which tends to reinstate, indeed strengthen,
1950s Cold War conclusions about the party’s slavish dependency on the USSR, and
therefore about the fatal weakness of Popular Frontism as ideology and practice.
 Gary Gerstle, ‘The protean character of American liberalism’, American Historical Review, 99
(1993), pp. 1043–73.
 Michael Kazin, ‘The agony and romance of the American left ’, American Historical Review, 100
(1995), pp. 1488–512, reviews the historiography of socialism and communism. Harvey Klehr et
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A ﬁnal interesting comparison between these books is that both appeared at moments
of revision: Warren’s as McCarthyism waned, and a sympathetic examination of the
diversity of motives and behaviour among American left-liberals, who were not all
dismissible simply as Stalin’s ‘ innocent dupes ’ (p. 221), became possible ; Kutulas’s as
the opening of Soviet archives made a generation of leftist scholarship arguing for the
CPUSA’s relative autonomy and status as a legitimate part of the left-liberal past less
tenable. Kutulas seems to have accommodated herself to these new tendencies
intellectually rather than emotionally, as her language occasionally shows: joining the
CP took ‘gumption’ (p. 236) ; the Rosenbergs were ‘ two ordinary people sucked into a
nightmarish world of conspiracy charges ’ (p. 229). But, despite the ﬂaws, hers is a
valuable contribution towards our understanding of intellectual politics in the
Depression generation.
How much all those scribblers ever really mattered is another question – Warren’s
and Kutulas’s characters thought that they had moved from the margins of American
society and politics between the 1920 and the 1930s, that they had some purchase on the
present and a workable vision of the future. It turns out that they had not, much, and
they did not ; but this probably will not stop more intellectual historians from
adding themselves retrospectively to left-liberal magazines’ subscription lists, sixty-plus
years on.	
III
With the last trio of books we remain in the 1930s, and we leave intellectual history
behind, but unfortunately we do not altogether escape the company of political
tendentiousness, something from which, it is clear from the works sampled already,
neither the left, the right, nor even the soggy middle of the US historical profession are
immune.
 It almost seems that a necessary qualiﬁcation for writing some of this stuﬀ
must be the ability to believe several implausible things before breakfast, lunch, tea,
dinner, and supper.
In some ways, ‘engaged’ history is admirable : it results from a conviction that the
past is ‘ relevant ’ and can bemade tomatter to the present. But the American past is also
dangerously convenient – there is lots of it, it is very various, so we can ﬁnd there what
we like. Too often the consequences of this approach lead to a caricatured version of that
past, without the ability to convince any but the already persuaded. This might be
acceptable if bad history could be made to serve any conceivably good public political
purpose. But when its most likely result is simply to mislead and confuse another
generation of graduate students, such work is scarcely excusable.
al., The Soviet world of American communism (New Haven, 1998), is the most recent addition from
Moscow archives to the embarrassments of the Old Left.
	 Alan Brinkley’s ‘The problem of American conservatism’ and Leo P. Ribuﬀo’s rejoinder
‘Why is there so much conservatism in the United States and why do so few historians know
anything about it? ’,American Historical Review, 99 (1994), pp. 409–29 and 438–49, represent a long-
overdue acceptance by some US historians that the profession’s preoccupation with a left-liberal
account of American political development has rather missed the point.

 Nor, of course, are their critics. Peter Novick, That noble dream: the ‘objectivity question ’ and the
American historical profession (NewYork, 1988), esp. Section iv, provides useful background on recent
intellectual and political currents among American historians, and explains why they produce
some of the sorts of work here reviewed.
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Staughton Lynd’s collection We are all leaders is a strange hybrid. Lynd himself has
pursued a long and distinguished career on what is left of the American left, as a
historian and latterly a community activist, public-interest lawyer, and educational
worker for a local union. What he and his collaborators have produced can be viewed
on at least two levels : (i) as a series of minor but interesting contributions to the history
of American workers’ movements in the 1930s, a journey around the margins consisting
of a map of roads less travelled or since abandoned, often because they turned out to be
dead ends ; (ii) as a collection of parables – most obviously Stan Weir’s rosy-tinted
reminiscences of life as a labour activist in the waterfront and maritime unions of the
1940s. These are intended to instruct and inspire contemporary critics of America’s
cautious, conservative, overcentralized, bureaucratic, and essentially impotent unions,
and sympathizers with rank-and-ﬁle workers’ insurgent movements within and beyond
them. At a time when the American labour movement is weaker, in the private sector,
than at any time since the 1920s, Lynd and his collaborators ﬁnd a message of hope, of
missed but not unrecoverable opportunities, of the possibilities of renewal, in those
aspects of the 1930s and 1940s they have chosen to study. This is precisely the kind of
advocacy history in search of a usable past for which excuses can be made, if necessary.
But one has to wonder how useful a dense 343-page book, with lots of footnotes but no
pictures, retailing even in paperback (unless heavily discounted) at the price of a decent
dinner in an American family restaurant, can hope to be in reaching an audience
beyond the seminar.
The book consists of eight substantive chapters sandwiched between a programmatic
essay by Lynd and Weir’s homiletic memoir. Three are reprinted from the authors’
recent monographs or venerable articles, with the other ﬁve newly published in this
collection. Half of the authors are university-aﬃliated; the others, whose work is equally
as good, have a variety of activist-type jobs. They all seem to agree prettymuchwith one
another, so it is fair to discuss them together. They deal with: a brieﬂy successful
communist-led movement among African-American, largely female, nutpickers in St
Louis, Missouri, in 1933–4 ; an old Wobbly-led independent union of meat processors
(including spam makers) and other workers in small towns and cities in Minnesota in
1933–7 ; the Southern cotton textile workers’ strike of 1934, represented as a casualty of
union–government co-operation in service to employers’ objectives ; the Southern
Tenant Farmers’ Union, c. 1934–9, done down this time (an interesting twist,
reminding one of the disagreements between the Old Left and the New) by some of the
early Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO)’s communist activists ; local
movements for an independent labour party in 1934–6, ended by the consummation of
the supposedly barren marriage between the oﬃcial labour movement and the
Democratic party ; community-based labour organization in Minneapolis and in a
small Ohio city ; and north-east Pennsylvania anthracite ‘bootleggers ’ – unemployed
miners digging and selling coal on their own account, from land they did not own.
The collection has already been subjected to friendly but expert criticism with which
it is hard to disagree. Most of it focused, not on the authors’ few factual errors or most
arguable interpretations of clouded events, but on their overall perspective. This is that
in the 1930s – particularly in the years before the founding of the CIO and passage of
the National Labor Relations, or Wagner, Act in 1935 – a form of labour activism
ﬂourished in the United States which was qualitatively diﬀerent from, and better than,
 ‘ ‘‘We are all leaders ’’ : a symposium on a collection of essays dealing with alternative
unionism in the early 1930s ’, Labor History, 38 (1998), pp. 165–201.
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what followed. It was ‘democratic, deeply rooted in mutual aid among workers in
diﬀerent crafts and work sites, and politically independent. The key to the value system
of alternative unionism was its egalitarianism’ (p. 3). It is claimed to have been at least
as eﬀective in recruiting as the later CIO, and more eﬀective in representing its
members’ shopﬂoor interests. A lineage for these activist episodes is traced back to a
‘culture of struggle ’ at least a generation earlier. Cases similar to that which, for
example, Dana Frank examined, become the bases of a better past – including the kind
of labour movement she too imagined as an alternative to the actual disappointments
of history. The CIO, which, as Lynd recalls from his boyhood, ‘was considered the most
progressive social force in the United States ’ (p. 1), is represented as the enemy and
extinguisher of these movements, committed as it was to working in collaboration with
the New Deal state to win institutional stability and recognition by managements.
Substitution of representative for direct democracy, of centralized for local control, of
organization by plant and industry for organization by community, and of orderly,
contract-bound employment relations for spontaneity and strikes, have often been
considered as the terms of a kind of Faustian bargain between labour’s ‘New Men of
Power’ and deeply entrenched corporate, legal, and political establishments. Lynd et
al. go beyond this to suggest that a type of labourmovement they ﬁnd almost worse than
none at all was inherent in the CIO leaders’ ‘project ’ rather than the result of a series
of compromises with stern necessity.
None of these accusations is new; some were current at the time, others ﬁlled the
pages of Radical America and like magazines in the 1960s and 1970s, and have formed the
basic arguments of a school of academic monographs ever since. None of them is entirely
without foundation. The issue between adherents of this viewpoint and critics from
what is sometimes called, perjoratively, a ‘ labor realist ’ perspective, is this : can one
build a credible alternative account of the past (and therefore of a, foreclosed, better
possible present and future) by counterposing a series of sometimes sentimentalized
case-studies of short-term movements ending in extinction, often among workers in
marginal industries and small communities, to the larger story of what actually
happened in the later 1930s to bring enduring organization to millions of workers in
America’s industrial heartland? The question is usually asked rhetorically ; the expected
answer is No. Lynd et al. respond that the cases they have studied were not marginal and
that, even if they were, to dismiss them on that basis is elitist and therefore wrong –
‘enormous condescension’ again. More plausibly, they point out that what worked for
American labour, after a fashion, in the 1930s through to the 1960s, no longer does, so
that the future means of representation of the shrinking working class’s interests is once
again up for grabs. Reinterpretation of what went wrong in the 1930s and 1940s is
supposed to reopen old, arguably better, options.
No meeting of minds is likely in this debate. More than disagreements as to fact, the
purposes of historical research, and requirements for the production of generalizable
interpretations, are at issue here. Ideology per se is not the basic problem. Most of the
arguments are among academics who are all, in American terms, quite left of centre,
and very unusual in the degree of interest and sympathy they hold for the American
labour movement, such as it is. The line of division between Lynd et al. and their critics
seems to be a matter of temperament. Many historians who have continued to read,
 For an authoritative treatment of the CIO, see Robert H. Zieger,The CIO, 	
–	
 (Chapel
Hill, 1995), and discussion in ‘Robert Zieger’s history of the CIO: a symposium’, Labor History, 37
(1996), pp. 157–88.
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research, and keep their eyes on the troubled present since the old ‘New Left ’s days of
hope, have been chastened by the experience. They have become impressed by the
extent to which, even in the 1930s, many American workers remained cool to the
beneﬁts of collective action, or only joined unions after the latter demonstrated their
ability to deliver concrete, immediate gains. They are more persuaded about the
importance barriers of race, ethnicity, gender, occupation, skill-level, and locality posed
to the construction of any signiﬁcant workers’ movement than they are by moments of
transcendence. They have come to appreciate the beneﬁts, even the necessity, of
leadership and bureaucracy, if social movements of those with few power resources are
to be at all durable. They have become conscious of the usually hostile political, legal,
and ideological American climate, and in particular of the bitter and eﬀective war most
American employers have waged against most unions, most of the time. The Faustian
bargain, if that is what it was, does not look so bad, under the circumstances. A battle
rumbles on between social-democratic pessimism informed by things as they are and
have been, and radical optimism reinforced by selective nostalgia. No end is in sight.
Political scientist Colin Gordon’s book was announced by its publisher as ‘ the ﬁrst
major reinterpretation of the New Deal in almost thirty years ’, presumably comparing
it with Ellis W. Hawley’s magisterial and still reliable work. How true was this? Before
answering, I must declare an interest : I participated, with others, in a lively and
exhaustive online review symposium focused on New Deals, through the H-BUSINESS
discussion list, shortly after it was published. Exchanges with the author became heated
and personal. There was no meeting of minds here either. Gordon’s originality had
evidently provoked a reaction among his peers, but probably not the one he would have
wanted, and not from the peers he might have chosen. Reviews in scholarly journals
were more mixed. The most critical assessments of ‘a book everyone can hate’ came
from middle-aged or older male historians of US business and labour relations, like
myself. No one faulted the breadth and depth of Gordon’s research in the right primary
and secondary sources. The problem was that the result of his extensive investigations
was a version of the past scarcely recognizable, and largely incredible, to others who had
trodden the same path.
Three years later, after the heat of battle, is the book any better for another cool
reading? No. The argument remains unacceptable. It depends neither on suppressio veri
nor suggestio falsi, but on a nuanced rhetorical technique. Gordon qualiﬁes much that he
has to say, in a suitably scholarly fashion, but the overall eﬀect of his decisions as to
selection, presentation, emphasis, and interpretation is to point towards conclusions
which are untenable. The heart of the book presents a case for continuity rather than
discontinuity in policy making between the Republican 1920s and the Rooseveltian
New Deal of 1933–5, which is made in two ways: speciﬁcally, that the key measures
extending the federal government’s power in the areas of economic regulation (the 1933
 See ‘Nelson Lichtenstein’s Walter Reuther : a symposium’, Labor History, 37 (1996),
pp. 332–64 – Lichtenstein makes the best case for lost opportunities in The most dangerous man in
Detroit : Walter Reuther and the fate of American labor (New York, 1995).
 Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the problem of monopoly (Princeton, 1966).
 Daniel Nelson in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50 (1997), pp. 537–8 at p. 537. For other
opinions, see American Historical Review, 101 (1996), p. 584 ; Business History, 37 (1995), pp. 127–8 ;
Business History Review, 69 (1995), pp. 435–7*; Economic History Review, 48 (1995), pp. 633–4*;
International Review of Social History, 50 (1997), p. 537 ; Journal of American History, 82 (1995),
pp. 1261–2 ; Journal of Economic History, 55 (1995), pp. 725–6 ; Labor History, 36 (1995), pp. 481–3.
Asterisked reviews are the most favourable.
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National Industrial Recovery Act), industrial relations (the Wagner Act), and social
insurance and public welfare (the 1935 Social Security Act), had deep roots in the self-
regulatory initiatives undertaken by parts of the business community in the 1920s ;
generally and fundamentally, that business interests continued to dominate the policy-
making process in these areas in the 1930s, appearances, unhelpful evidence, and
received interpretations to the contrary.
To take the second point ﬁrst, Gordon clearly sits at the end of a materialist andor
marxisant tradition in US historiography which was quite inﬂuential in the 1960s and
1970s and still lingers on. One of its objects was to explain, or explain away, apparent
deviations from the central thesis that business runs the show – particularly in the
‘Progressive Era’ and New Deal, when it sometimes seemed not to – by arguing that,
at a higher or deeper level, business was still running the show even when most
contemporaries – including most businesspeople – thought it was not. A favoured
explanation among the old ‘New Left ’ was that American politics, superﬁcially
democratic and pluralistic, was in fact elitist and manipulative. This was not in the
realistic sense that, though most can speak, some voices speak louder than others, but
because of the belief that behind policies which were thought, even by most
businesspeople, to be anti-business, one could ﬁnd small coteries of really important
(sophisticated, far-sighted) businesspeople and their political or intellectual associates,
pulling the strings.
This ‘corporate liberal ’ interpretation was attractive to lovers of conspiracy theses,
but proved diﬃcult to verify empirically. Gordon is too sharp not to distance himself
from such a discredited position, but echoes of it linger on in his work, alongside more
sophisticated structuralist accounts of divisions of interest within the business
community, and of its means of determining public policy. Thus, for example, if a few
wholly unrepresentative businesspeople could be dredged up to serve as friendly
witnesses before a congressional committee making a case for a proposal the business
community overwhelmingly rejected, Gordon will cite their views. The technique of
argumentation depends on implicit quantiﬁcation: their actual tiny numbers sheltering
behind the indeﬁnite language of ‘many’ and ‘most ’, a stage army of a handful or fewer
businesspeople favouring, or prepared to accept, theWagner Act or (parts of the) Social
Security system, can bemarshalled and selectively quoted to prove the case.Where even
this approach will not wash, as in the case of the Wagner Act, Gordon bolsters it with
a second argument, that the failure of business to oppose such measures eﬀectively, or
its subsequent coming to terms with aspects of them, can be read backwards to
transmute murderous hostility into paternity.
So much for the general method. The detailed accounts of the weaknesses of the US
economy in the 1920s, of initiatives in the areas of ‘welfare capitalism’ by a minority of
larger andor notably liberal employers, of business’s capacity for self-organization, and
of experiments in ‘regulatory unionism’ (joint union–employer attempts to control
product market instability), are deeply ﬂawed, inviting an ‘Up to a point, Lord
Copper’ response. But they are the foundations for the argument of essential continuity
between that decade’s unsuccessful private-sector policy making and the political
departures of the 1930s. In the latter sections of the book, the reader’s hackles rise
further, and – often an acid test – when Gordon is writing about that which one knows,
in detail, from the archival inside, amazed laughter is the only possible reaction. The
worst section of the book, which represents a contribution to knowledge in a strictly
negative sense, deals with the Wagner Act ; that on the National Industrial Recovery
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Act is less unreliable, but other, fuller and less loaded, recent accounts are to be
preferred; while the problems with the section on the Social Security Act are mostly
matters of emphasis. To mix the metaphor, how many grains of sand and straws in the
wind does it take to construct the foundations for a house of cards?
Finally, leaving the best till last, we come to Plotke. He shares the same publisher and
discipline as Gordon, once found himself in the same small corner of the political and
intellectual universe, and deals with the same period and many of the same issues. That
is as far as the similarity goes. Evidently, having had one unsuccessful try at producing
‘ the ﬁrst major reinterpretation of the New Deal in almost thirty years ’, CUP
determined to make another attempt two years later. This time, they succeeded.
Plotke’s is not an easy book to read – he writes well and clearly, but without Gordon’s
occasional sparkle ; there are no deliberate or inadvertent jokes, and enjoyment has to
be derived instead from the spectacle of Plotke lambasting Error in devastating
footnotes. As Plotke seems to have read everything and to disagree with most of it, there
are plenty of these. The approach is relentlessly and persuasively analytical, but
unrelievedly dry. There are few stories, and not many individuals. Plotke’s is a book
about systems, not about chaps.
His central argument is plain and convincing: the NewDeal was a political event and
achievement, to be explained by giving primacy to political actors and discourses.
Attempts (like Gordon’s) to account for it by some variant of an economically
determinist model have failed; attempts by other political scientists to explain it as just
another stage in state building, or a product of the electoral process, or a reﬂection of
the hegemony of liberal beliefs in the United States, are at best partly successful, such
overarching theories having diﬃculty coping with a period of rapid, deliberate, self-
consciously reformist political change.
Plotke is interested in how a new regime with a distinctive outlook, programme, and
support-base of interest groups and electoral constituencies, was constructed in the crisis
years of the early 1930s, and lasted in essentials through the 1960s. He calls this a
‘Democratic Political Order ’, despite his cogent argument that the Democratic party
itself was one of the weakest elements in the structure. This is probably to distinguish his
account from themore pessimistic conclusions of the contributors to Fraser andGerstle’s
Rise and fall of the New Deal order, who have pre-empted what might otherwise have been
a better title. But he also does so because he argues that the regime was indeed
democratic in content, character, and outcome, as well as by party name – an
outgrowth of ‘progressive liberalism’ in the American political tradition.
The passage of the Wagner Act and the ensuing growth of the CIO are central to
Plotke’s argument, as they were to Lynd et al. and Gordon; the diﬀerence is that he gets
things right about this ‘central…success story’ (p. 126) of the NewDeal, rubbishing an
entire generation of bad scholarship along the way. Plotke’s case is so compelling that
it is hard to understand why otherwise intelligent people should have spent so much
time so perversely, barking up the wrong trees.
 Donald Brand, Corporatism and the rule of law: a study of the National Recovery Act (Ithaca, 1988).
 Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The rise and fall of the New Deal order, 	
–	
#
(Princeton, 1989).
 Melvyn Dubofsky, The state and labor in modern America (Chapel Hill, 1994), complements
Plotke’s work on the Wagner Act’s political origins by examining its implementation and impact,
in the process wreaking the same kind of destruction among ‘critical legal historians ’ as Plotke
manages for their political ‘ science’ comrades.
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Time and again, Plotke resolves arguments critical of the New Deal Order and its
successor, often termed Cold War Liberalism, in its favour. Rather than the New Deal
having been a pro-business con on the American people, it is represented as a positive
programme designed, in fact, by New Dealers – the left-of-centre lawyers and other
academics, advisers and appointed oﬃcials, party strategists and politicians, who
devised policies, argued for and implemented them, served and recreated the party’s
popular base. The role of grass-roots demand in stimulating and legitimizing change is
not neglected, but the insiders take most of the credit ; and they are their own people,
not anybody’s tools. What they devised was a credible, acceptable, and partly workable
solution to the multiple crises of the depression. The most likely alternatives at the time
to the course they charted were not better but worse : Plotke is dismissive of the
Communist party, whose ‘ language…had no prospect of being widely accepted’, and
whose proposals were ‘deeply unattractive’ to most contemporaries, not just to the
author (pp. 99–100). The non-communist left is also written oﬀ, as is the common
notion among academics that the New Deal Democratic Party was once, or could have
become, something like a European social democratic movement. At all times – Plotke
focuses on the middle 1930s, then jumps to the early Truman era – the real argument
lay between the New Deal’s progressive liberalism and an older, pro-business, Southern
Democratic and Republican conservatism bordering on reaction.
New Deal Democrats can be faulted – Plotke attacks, in particular, the Truman
administration’s record on the civil rights of communists and African-Americans, the
Democrats’ failure to engage with emerging ‘women’s issues ’, and their neglect of the
atrophying popular base of their federal administration-centred regime. But, in an age
of electoral apathy and political demobilization, with Gingriches in Congress and
congress in the Oval Oﬃce, Plotke’s is a reminder of a lost world of decent possibilities.
Nobody interested in the history of the United States since the 1930s can aﬀord not to
read this book packed with intelligence and insight. The second volume of this major
work, provisionally entitled Democratic breakup, which will give the decline of this
political order as much attention as he has provided to its creation and endurance, is
eagerly awaited.
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